Case Summaries by unknown
Journal of Environmental and Sustainability Law 
Missouri Environmental Law and Policy Review 
Volume 3 




Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl 
 Part of the Environmental Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Case Summaries, 3 Mo. Envtl. L. & Pol'y Rev. 46 (1994) 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jesl/vol3/iss1/7 
This Case Summary is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at University of Missouri 
School of Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Environmental and 
Sustainability Law by an authorized editor of University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository. For more 
information, please contact bassettcw@missouri.edu. 
CASE SUMMARIES
CERCLA
Curran Composites, Inc. v. Liberty Mu-
tual Insurance Co., 874 F. Supp. 261
(W.D. Mo. 1994)
This diversity action stems from a dispute
between Curran Composites (Curran) and
Liberty Mutual Insurance (Liberty) over the
scope of coverage for environmental cleanup
under comprehensive general liability and
umbrella excess liability insurance policies.
Curran alleged that Liberty breached those
contracts in that Liberty failed both to reim-
burse him for cleanup costs and defend him
during his involvement with the Environ-
mental Protection Agency (EPA). Motion
for summary judgement was granted in favor
of Liberty.
Curran owns and operates a resin produc-
tion plant in Saukville, Wisconsin. Curran
bought the plant from Freeman Chemical
Company and received all of Freeman's
rights and interests in the property. Liberty
provided insurance coverage for both Free-
man and Curran. The plant generates a
substance called "reaction water," which is
classified as a liquid hazardous waste. In
1952, the State of Wisconsin informed Free-
man that the reaction water from the plant
could be disposed of in a dry well at the
Saukville facility. Freeman disposed of his
waste in this manner until 1965. In 1979,
the EPA and the Wisconsin Department of
Natural Resources (WDNR) determined that
the reaction water leached into the munici-
pal water supply, causing vast groundwater
contamination. In 1987, Freeman made a
claim to Liberty to recover the cost of
investigating and remediating contamina-
tion at the Saukville facility. In 1989, Liberty
informed Freeman that it had denied his
claim for reimbursement of costs.
Wisconsin law provides that letters from a
governmental agency requesting cleanup do
not constitute a "suit." As such, no duty to
defend was triggered. The Wisconsin courts
have ruled that a "suit" applies only to a court
proceeding and not something that is func-
tionally equivalent. Since no claim in the
form of a lawsuit was filed, Liberty had no
duty to defend.
The determination whether Liberty had
an obligation to reimburse Curran for costs
incurred in conducting an environmental
cleanup, hinged on the definition of the word
"damages" in the insurance policy. Under
Wisconsin law, "damages" are interpreted
to be "legal compensation for past wrongs
or injuries." The Wisconsin Supreme Court
had held that cleanup costs under the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) and
equivalent state statutes did not constitute
damages in an insurance policy context.
Curran had entered into a consent decree
with the EPA and WDNR under the Re-
source Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) to remediate the Oroduction site.
Since RCRA and CERCLA were comple-
mentary statutes, the district court found that
cleanup costs under RCRA were not dam-
ages in the current situation. Therefore, the
court held that Curran had no claim for
reimbursement from Liberty.
- by Greg Moldafsky
Harley-Davidson, Inc. v. Minstar, Inc., 41
F.3d 341 (7th Cir. 1994)
Minstar, Incorporated and AMF, Incorpo-
rated (Minstar), previous owners of a manu-
facturing plant, successfully defended a Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation and Liability Act (CERCLA) suit
brought by Harley-Davidson. Harley-
Davidson bought a manufacturing plant from
a predecessor of Minstar. Upon purchase,
the buyer agreed to indemnify the seller
against all liabilities relating to the property
of the plant. In time the land on which the
plant was located was deemed to be con-
taminated, and Harley-Davidson was bur-
dened with the clean-up costs. CERCLA
gives the owner of the contaminated land
the right to seek contribution from other
persons who are responsible for the con-
tamination. Harley-Davidson brought an
action against Minstar and others for contri-
bution. Minstar argued the indemnity agree-
ment in defense, but the district court found
that the agreement was invalid under
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CERCLA. The district judge certified this
interlocutory ruling for an immediate appeal.
Harley-Davidson's first argued that the
indemnification agreement was invalid. Sec-
tion 107(e) of CERCLA states that no in-
demnification or similar agreement shall be
effective to pass liability to any other person.
However, the second sentence of this exact
provision states that nothing in this subsec-
tion shall prohibit any agreement to indem-
nify a party for liability. The Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals found that as a whole, the
subsection does not outlaw indemnification
agreements, but its purpose is to keep the
liable party from transferring liability. Indem-
nification does not "transfer" liability, rather
the indemnified party remains fully liable but
is able to share the clean up expense. The
court states that the only time the drafters
have barred shifting the costs of liability is in
the case of deliberate wrongdoing.
Harley-Davidson's next argued that if in-
demnification occurs, potential polluters will
have little incentive to avoid CERCLA liabil-
ity. The court points out that this is a
problem with any form of insurance. There
is no evidence of a decision disallowing
polluters to insure. Furthermore, it would be
totally inconsistent with CERCLA which
explicitly allows such agreements.
Finally, Harley-Davidson argued that the
scope of the indemnification agreement was
too narrow to encompass the contamination
of the plant site. The court quickly dispelled
this argument, stating the agreement could
not be more broadly worded. The agree-
ment states, "[Harley-Davidson] shall . . .
indemnify AMF Incorporated against all debts,
liabilities, and obligations, without any limi-
tations." The court enforced the indemnifi-
cation agreement and barred Harley-
Davidson's claim against the defendants.
- by Jacqueline K. Hamra
Modem Constructors, Inc. v. Continental
Casualty Co., 38 F.3d 377 (8th Cir. 1994)
Appellant Modem Constructors, Inc. (Mod-
em) brought a declaratory judgment action
against its comprehensive general liability
insurer, Continental Casualty Company (Con-
tinental). Modem was a third-party defen-
dant in a Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act
(CERCLA) cost-recovery action and sought
a declaration of coverage for any potential
liability it may have at a contaminated waste
site in Minnesota. The district court granted
Continental's motion for summary judg-I - M E LP R
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ment claiming a pollution exclusion in the
insurance policy precluded coverage. The
district court further held a "sudden and
accidental" exception to the exclusion did
not apply since the release of pollutants at
the site occurred over many years.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court's decision. Modem
contended on appeal that the term "sudden
and accidental" did not require a temporally
abrupt release. Instead, Modem urged the
court to read the language as meaning
"unexpected or unintended," negating the
interpretation requiring a short period of
time.
After the district court ruled on the case,
the Minnesota Supreme Court held in Board
of Regents v. Royal Insurance Co., 517
N.W.2d 888 (Minn. 1994), that the term
"sudden" had a temporal connotation. Read-
ing "sudden" to mean "unexpected" would
make the use of the word "accidental"
redundant. The court concluded a release of
asbestos fibers over twenty years was not
sudden and accidental."
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals relied
on the Minnesota Supreme Court's interpre-
tation and concluded the exception to the
pollution exclusion did not apply to the
gradual release of a pollutant over several
years.
- by Stephen B. Maule
United States v. Charles George Truck-
ing, Inc., 34 F.3d 1081 (1st Cir. 1994)
Suits filed by the United States and the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts against
the owner-operators of a hazardous waste
site were combined and amended to also
include a group of generator and transporter
defendants. These new defendants
impleaded additional generator defendants.
After issuing a case management order
(CMO), which expressly prevented the United
States from bringing suit against the third-
party defendants, the District Court for the
District of Massachusetts determined all de-
fendants except for the appellants to be
liable for the cleanup.
The court then facilitated settlement ne-
gotiations between the Government and the
various defendants. Two consent decrees
resulted: one terminated liability of the
generators, transporters, and third-party
defendants fora settlement of $36,000,000,
and the second, pertaining to the
government's claim against the appellants,
proposed a payment of $3,100,000. Both
decrees became finalized in district court
hearings, which held the decrees to be just
and in accord with the governing principles
of the Comprehensive Environmental Re-
sponse, Compensation and Liability Act
(CERCLA).
Charles George Trucking, Incorporated
appealed the entry of the decrees based on
several arguments to which the First Circuit
Court of Appeals applied a standard of
review of manifest abuse of discretion. The
court stated that for CERCLA consent de-
crees, the over-riding requirement is fairness
and faithfulness to CERCLA objectives.
Further, the Court found it must give great
deference to the findings of both the EPA
and the trial court.
The appellants first claimed that the con-
sent decrees were not reasonable in light of
the fact that they did not effectively carry out
the objectives of CERCLA and the district
court did not hold an evidentiary hearing to
determine efficacy before approval. The
instant court stated that a hearing is only
necessary in special cases. An independent
review of the record, the court held, revealed
a particularly effective remedy.
Appellants also argued that the consent
decrees were not faithful to the statute's
objectives, one of the most important being
the goal of fairness. The court determined
that because of appellant's faulty record-
keeping and the nature of the clean-up, it
would have been impossible for the consent
decrees to assign a specific amount of liabil-
ity to each defendant. Therefore, requiring
the various potentially responsible parties
(PRPs) to allocate the cost of the payments
among themselves was both fair and practi-
cal.
In answer to the appellants' claim that the
consent decree settlements were not reason-
able, the court stated that the party's ability
to pay was not determinative. Instead, the
court compared the percentage of expected
cost with the percentage of attributed liability
of the two groups of defendants, and deter-
mined that the generators, transporters, and
third-party defendants were to pay slightly
more than their share of the costs by terms
of the consent decree. The court acknowl-
edged that the appellants, as non-settling
parties, may be liable for costs over the
estimated total amount, but the decrees
were reasonable nevertheless.
Finally, the appellants claimed that the
Government exceeded the scope of the
original CMO in submitting the two consent
decrees. The appellants specifically pointed
to overbreadth in terms of addressing claims
not pleaded before the court, and addressing
claims the CMO precluded. However, the
instant court held that because courts are
allowed a great deal of flexibility, the consent
decrees were well within the boundaries of
district court authority. Claims that were not
specifically pleaded against PRPs, which
were settled by virtue of the broad consent
decrees, were permissible because the claims
were still within the general scope of the
pleadings. Further, the court stated that
district courts can modify CMOs at will in the
interest of bringing about a swift and fair
settlement, which the court determined oc-
curred in the instant case.
- by Sarah Madden
United States v. Colorado & Eastern
Railroad Co., 25 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,309
(10th Cir. 1994)
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that claims involving potentially responsible
parties(PRPs) attempting to properly appor-
tion costs assessed under the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act (CERCLA) are always
considered contribution claims under
CERCLA §113; that, under §113, such
claims for contribution related to matters
addressed in settlement are barred; and any
settlement reduces the liability of other PRP's
who will not or have not settled by the
amount of the settlement.
In May 1965, a pesticide formulation
facility in Commerce City, Colorado burned
down. During reconstruction of the facility,
contaminated debris and materials were de-
posited throughout the site. From 1968
until 1984, the site changed ownership
three times. In 1983, the site was added to
the National Priorities List of hazardous
-L47PI 
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waste sites and ultimately the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) performed a reme-
dial investigation and feasibility study. The
EPA specified remediation measures neces-
sary to clean up the site. Pursuant to a
Record of Decision of these measure neces-
sary for clean up, the EPA initiated a lawsuit
against all PRP's which included Colorado &
Eastern Railroad Company (CERC), Farm-
land Industries (Farmland), and McKesson
Corporation (McKesson), the previous and
current owners.
Farmland and McKesson subsequently
entered into a Partial Consent Decree with
the EPA. They agreed to pay $700,000 in
response costs already incurred by the EPA
and to perform all remediation. Eventually,
CERC also entered into a Consent Decree
with the EPA in which they agreed to pay
$100,000 in response costs to the EPA.
Ultimately, all the defendants in the action
by the EPA cross-claimed against each other.
Farmland's claim against CERC was the
only claim not dismissed or settled prior to
trial. Farmland sued for cost recovery under
CERCLA §107, or in the alternative for
contribution under CERCLA §113(f). Judg-
ment was entered against CERC requiring
them to pay $734,058.34 plus post judg-
ment interest of $27,060.00.
CERC appealed contending the district
court erred first in applying strict liability
under §107 as opposed to requiring proof of
causation pursuant to §113(f)(1) and in deny-
ing them contribution protection under
§113(f)(2); second, in finding the costs re-
quested were "necessary and consistent"
with the National Contingency Plan; and
third, in failing to rule on CERC's Act-Of-
God and Act-Of-Third-Party defenses.
The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed the district court on the first claim that
the court applied the wrong section of
CERCLA and thus the wrong elements of
proof, and ruled the trial court was not in
error on the remaining two claims. As to the
first claim, the court held that claims for cost
recovery between PRP's is a claim for con-
tribution under §113(f) as opposed to §107
and thus the claimant must show causation.
Holding in favor of CERC, the court
reasoned that determining the extent of
4 il 1of a single party was difficult and
thus, unless the defendant can prove divis-
ibility, the court will apply joint and several
liability. The court then held that federal
authority recognizes a right to contribution
where PRPs are subject to joint and several
liability.
Applying §113(f), the court looked to the
legislative intent of CERCLA to encourage
settlement and thus broadly construed "mat-
ters addressed" to include the matters in-
volved in CERC's settlement with the EPA
and the earlier settlements between Farm-
land, McKesson and the EPA. Similarly, the
court chose the "pro tanto credit rule" to
reduce the potential liability of CERC by the
actual amount of the previous settlement
which nullified any liability attributable to
CERC.
The court also found that CERC's failure
to pay the settlement was irrelevant because
only the EPA can revoke a settlement and
they had not done so. In addition, the court
held that the trial court's determination that
response costs incurred by Farmland were
necessary and consistent with the National
Contingency Plan was not clearly errone-
ous, and that a defense of Act-Of-God or
Act-Of-Third-Party was not available for
contribution actions.
- by Joseph P. Hewes
Witco Corp. v. Beekhuis, 38 F.3d 682 (3rd
Cir. 1994)
In a case of first impression for federal
appellate courts, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the Comprehensive Envi-
ronmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act (CERCLA) statute of limitations
does not preempt state probate "nonclaim"
statutes. In Witco, a corporation knew that
a decedent was a potentially responsible
party (PRP) to a CERCLA priority site ac-
tion, but the company did not take advan-
tage of a Delaware state law allowing exten-
sions for such claims. Therefore, the com-
pany did not have three years after its own
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
settlement to sue for recovery. Instead, the
cause of action was barred eight months
after the PRP's death.
Dr. Beekhuis was the director and owner
of Halby Products (Halby), which in turn
owned a plot of land in Delaware (the site).
Halby merged into Witco Incorporated
(Witco), and the site was later sold to
Brandywine Chemical (Brandywine). In
1985, the EPA found the site to be contami-
nated and placed it on the CERCLA Na-
tional Priority List.
Dr. Beekhuis transferred all of his assets
to the Wilmington Trust Company to estab-
lish a lifetime income to himself, and upon
his death to pay off debts and expenses.
Residual assets from the first trust would go
into another trust for his daughter Jeanne.
Dr. Beekhuis died in March of 1989. Eight
months later, after the Delaware statute of
limitations for claims against the estate had
run out, all remaining assets were placed
into Jeanne's residuary trust. In December
of 1990, twenty months after Dr. Beekhuis'
death, Witco sought to impose a construc-
tive trust on the estate's assets. Witco's
petition was struck down as premature be-
cause the EPA had not yet asserted a claim
against the property. In August of 1991, the
EPA notified Witco, Brandywine and the
estate of Dr. Beekhuis that each was a PRP.
In 1992, Witco entered into a consent
decree with the EPA and proceeded to
cleanup the site, incurring expenses. Witco
filed a claim for contribution against Jeanne
Beekhuis, the corporation acting as trustee
for the estate, and Brandywine. Witco lost
on summary judgement, and Jeanne
Beekhuis won her counterclaim motion
against Witco for indemnification.
Defendants argued that because Witco
failed to present its CERCLA contribution
claim to the executrix of Dr. Beekhuis' estate
within eight months after Dr. Beekhuis'
death, the claim was barred under the Dela-
ware nonclaim statute. Witco contended
that CERCLA conflicts with the state statute,
and therefore the CERCLA limitations pe-
riod should preempt the state statute. The
CERCLA limitation for contribution claims
allows three years after Witco entered into
the consent decree. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(g)(3).
In reaching its decision, the court noted
the presumption against federal preemption
of state law, especially in areas traditionally
dominated by the individual states. Probate
matters were held to be such an area. The
court first stated as a settled fact that CERCLA
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does not expressly preempt all state law, nor
is it such a comprehensive scheme of regu-
lation as to provide no room for supplemen-
tation. Therefore the only issue left open
was whether the state law actually conflicts
with the federal regulation. This issue was
broken down into two questions: (1) is it
possible to comply with both laws, and, (2)
does the state law stand as an obstacle to the
intent of Congress?
Is it possible to comply with both laws?
The Delaware estate nonclaim statute ex-
pressly provides a mechanism to preserve
CERCLA contingent contribution claims. If
Witco asserted a claim against the executrix
within eight months of Dr. Beekhuis' death,
then the company could have petitioned the
state court for a filing extension. The
company would then have been able to file
its contribution claim up to three years after
its settlement, as per the federal regulation.
Therefore, it would have been entirely pos-
sible for Witco to comply with both the state
and federal statutes of limitation.
Does the state law stand as an obstacle to
the intent of Congress? The court recog-
nized that there could be instances where a
PRP seeking contribution would find it im-
possible to comply with both state nonclaim
statutes and with the CERCLA statute of
limitations. For example, a state nonclaim
statute could run out before a PRP even
became aware of his own liability. This
could interfere with Congress' intent to en-
sure that those parties who are responsible
for contamination pay its cost. Previous
district court rulings held that state probate
nonclaim statutes do stand as an obstacle to
Congress' intent and are therefore pre-
empted. The court rejected these holdings.
The court noted four main reasons for its
decision: (1) the states' interest in quick
resolution of probate disputes; (2) the
CERCLA "innocent landowner defense,"
which protects those who inherit land from
liability; (3) the fact that CERCLA references
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure § 17(b),
which provide that state laws determine
capacity to be sued; and (4) the fact that it
may be impossible to trace and retrieve the
money from an estate at the time that
CERCLA liability is imposed, which may be
decades after the distribution.
The other main issue in the case was one
of first impression in the Third Circuit Court
of Appeals. The court found that the Dela-
ware statute requiring corporations to in-
demnify agents is not preempted by
CERCLA. Delaware law provides for broad
indemnification protection where a corpo-
rate officer successfully defends himself
against personal liability claims that arise
from his corporate position. Under federal
law, Dr. Beekhuis could have been found
personally liable as an "operator" within the
meaning of CERCLA. However, the court
found that Dr. Beekhuis' personal liability
under CERCLA does not, by itself, void the
Delaware corporate indemnity shield. Witco
made no claims that Dr. Beekhuis' actions
were not performed directly on behalf of
Halby. Therefore, the court held that the
estate was entitled to indemnification from
Witco.
- by Kin Semsch
Price v. United States Navy, 39 F.3d 1011
(9th Cir. 1994)
In October, 1988 Gloria Price hired Syl-
van Pools to construct a swimming pool in
the backyard of her property. While exca-
vating the backyard, Sylvan discovered what
appeared to be asbestos in the soil. After
contacting the San Diego County of Health
Services, Price discovered that her property,
as well as the property of four neighbors,
was contaminated with asbestos, lead, zinc
and copper. It was later determined that
Price's house was constructed on the site of
an old landfill used by the United States Navy
during the 1930's. Price instituted a private
cost recovery action pursuant to the Com-
prehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA)
against the Navy in federal district court. She
requested that the Navy pay the costs she
incurred in removing the contamination as
well as the attorneys' fees she incurred in
prosecuting this action. She also requested
that the Navy pay all of the medical bills she
incurred in monitoring her health for latent
diseases that may occur as a result of her
contact with the hazardous waste. These
medical bills were for services such as tissue
sampling, chromosomal testing, epidemio-
logical studies and other assistance. Finally,
she requested additional costs under the
Resource Compensation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) that she would incur in removing the
remaining contamination located under the
foundation of her house.
The district court used a comparative fault
analysis to find that the Navy was ninety-five
percent responsible for Price's costs and
that the man who sold the land to Price was
one percent at fault. However, since Price
was already compensated for the full amount
of her clean-up costs by Sylvan pools, the
court ruled that she could collect nothing
from either party. The court also ruled that
private "response costs" do not include
medical monitoring in order to discover a
potential disease which might have been
caused by a person's exposure to the haz-
ardous waste. The court found that she was
not entitled to recover under RCRA and that
she was not entitled to recover her attorneys'
fees. Price appealed these rulings.
After determining that Price's appeal was
valid even though she did not sign her Notice
of Appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals examined the issue of whether private
"response costs" under 42 U.S.C.
§9607(a)(4)(B) may include expenses for
medical monitoring. The court, relying on
Daigle v. Shell Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1527 (10th
Cir. 1992), found that they did not. That
court focused on the legislative intent of the
enactors of CERCLA in determining that
CERCLA was not intended to pay for medi-
cal monitoring costs. Essentially, it found
that the legislature purposefully deleted pro-
visions for the collection of personal medical
expenses or loss of income in earlier ver-
sions of the bill. This coupled with the fact
that CERCLA, in other parts of the bill, does
provide for the assessment of health risks in
regard to the hazardous substance regula-
tion convinced theDaiglecourt that CERCLA
was not intended to allow recovery for
personal medical monitoring costs under the
guise of private "response" costs. The
instant court agreed with this reasoning and
held that Price could not recovery those
costs.
The court next tumed to the issue of
whether a private party may be able to
recovery attorneys' fees in a CERCLA ac-
tion as part of the "response" costs.MELPR
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court looked to a recently decided case, Key
Tronic Corp. v. U.S., 114 S.Ct. 1960, 128
L.Ed.2d 797 (1994), in determining under
what circumstances a private party may be
entitled to attomeys' fees. The Court in Key
Tronic ruled that "response" costs for pri-
vate actions will include attorneys' fees, but
only those fees incurred as a result of the
attempt to identify other potentially respon-
sible parties. The court in the instant case
remanded this issue back to the district court
for a determination of exactly how much of
Price's legal fees were incurred by searching
for potentially responsible parties.
The court then determined that the dis-
trict court's use of comparative fault detenni-
nation was proper. The court found that
although CERCLA can use joint and several
liability in cases of indivisible harm, the
determination of the proper theory of recov-
ery should be handled in accordance with
the common law.
Finally, the court addressed whether or
not Price should be able to recover under
RCRA for the costs associated with the
additional removal of possibly contaminated
soil located under her house's foundation.
The court ruled that in order for the RCRA
claim to succeed, Price would need to prove
that the hazardous material under her foun-
dation presented an "imminent and substan-
tial endangerment" to her health or environ-
ment. This "imminent and substantial"
endangerment need not consist of any ac-
tual harm but need only be a threatened or
potential harm. The court concluded that
Price did not meet her burden of proving that
her potential harm met any of the criteria to
succeed in a RCRA action. The court ruled
this way primarily based on the testimony of
experts who examined and tested nearby
property and who had found that there was
very little danger, imminent or otherwise,
that would require immediate action. The
court found that even though contaminants
may still exist on the property, and even
though this contamination may decrease the
value of the property, if the level of the
contamination is not high enough to pose a
"substantial and imminent" threat, further
action was unnecessary.
- by Byron Woehlecke
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United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corpo-
ration, 38 F.3d 862 (7th Cir. 1994)
On behalf of the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (EPA), the United States brought
suit against Bethlehem Steel Corporation
(Bethlehem) to enforce the requirements for
hazardous waste under Resource Conserva-
tion and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Safe
Drinking Water Act (SDWA). The Seventh
Circuit Court of Appeals addressed three
main issues: 1) whether Bethlehem could
assert impossibility as a defense to compli-
ance with the underground injection control
"UIC" permits for its discharge of ammonia,
2) whether the district court appropriately
ordered injunctive relief and 3) whether
Bethlehem's mixture of hazardous waste
with non-hazardous waste constituted a listed
hazardous waste for compliance purposes
with RCRA's interim status requirements.
As for the first issue, the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals affirmed the partial sum-
mary judgment and injunction against
Bethlehem Steel for violating the Under-
ground Injection Control "UIC" permit re-
quirements of RCRA and Safe Drinking
Water Act (SDWA). The Bums Harbor
steelmaking facility in Indiana, under the
ownership and operation of the Bethlehem
Steel Corp., violated RCRA and SDWA by
failing to comply with the UIC permit re-
quirements. Compliance with UIC permits
under SDWA also satisfies RCRA require-
ments. Bethlehem's discharge of hazardous
waste, ammonia waste liquor, required its
compliance. Bethlehem received two UIC
permits upon the condition that Bethlehem
would enact a three-phased program to
correctly manage its solid waste units. Time
limits governed each phase.
Bethlehem argued that it was relieved
from complying because the EPA fulfilled
Phase I of the corrective action by submitting
a RCRA Facility Assessment Report (RFA).
The court rejected Bethlehem's argument,
stating that even if the EPA's RFA did fulfill
the Phase I requirement, Bethlehem was still
required to submit a preliminary assess-
ment. Furthermore, the court noted that
Bethlehem failed to object to the time con-
straint deadlines and, therefore, Bethlehem
could not argue impossibility as a defense.
Next, the court approved of the partial
summary judgment, deeming the injunction
a permissible remedy. In reaching this
conclusion, the court found it permissible
that the district court failed to balance the
equities because Bethlehem willfully chose
not to comply. Additionally, the court noted
that the United States stood as the plaintiff
and that the case involved issues of public
health and safety.
Lastly, the court vacated the district court's
ruling which granted partial summary judg-
ment on several claims advanced by the
United States. The court remanded the case
and instructed the district court to grant
partial summary judgment for Bethlehem
instead. The court held that Bethlehem's
wastewater sludge did not constitute hazard-
ous waste under RCRA. Bethlehem mixed
electroplating wastewater, a byproduct of its
tin and chromium electroplating operation,
with non-hazardous wastewaters. Bethlehem
sent the resulting sludge to two lagoons.
The landfill held the sludge filtered out of
these lagoons. EPA allowed Bethlehem to
operate without a permit on an interim basis,
requiring the facility to manage its hazardous
waste in accordance with the standards
under the interim status.
Under RCRA, a listed waste must meet
the permit requirements in subtitle C. The
government argued that the sludge is a F006
listed waste which includes wastewater treat-
ment sludge from electroplating operations
since the language of the F006 listing con-
templates "mixed" sludges. Finding that the
F006 listing failed to mention mixes, the
court found Bethlehem's wastewater treat-
ment sludge not included as an F006 listed
waste. Even though the EPA published a
"mixture rule" in its final regulations regard-
ing the definition of hazardous waste, which
includes within the definition of hazardous
waste a listed hazardous waste that is mixed
with solid waste, the court explicitly rejected
this rule. Citing Shell Oil v. EPA, 950 F.2d
741 (D.C. Cir. 1991), which also rejected
the mixture rule, the court held that the F006
listing terms and the failure of the EPA to
amend F006 to include mixes reveals that
F006 does not apply to hazardous sludge
mixed with non-hazardous waste.
- by Jill MorrisI M~E LP R
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Owen Electric Steel Co. of South Caro-
lina, Inc. v. Browner, 37 F.3d 146 (4th Cir.
1994)
When does material which is ultimately to
be recycled become "solid waste" under
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
rules? In Owen Electric, the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals determined that slag from
a steel mill is a solid waste if it is left
"untouched" for six months before it is
"picked up" by another company for recy-
cling.
The Owen Electric Steel Company (Owen
Electric) produces steel in an electric arc
fumace. Residue (slag) is removed from the
metal and processed by a third party con-
tractor. After processing, the slag is placed
in bare earth holding bays to cure and
expand. After about six months of open-air
curing, the slag is sold to the construction
industry as an aggregate material for road-
beds.
After reviewing Owen Electric's proce-
dures, the EPA designated the slag process-
ing area as a solid waste management unit
(SWMU). This designation required further
EPA oversight and evaluation of the area.
Owen Electric disputed the finding, but the
EPA held to its original determination. A
series of administrative proceedings finally
led to Owen Electric's suit in circuit court.
The only issue in the case was whether or
not the slag constituted a "solid waste" for
the purposes of determining SWMU status.
Whether the slag was a "hazardous" mate-
rial was irrelevant to this case. In general, the
definition of "solid waste" only includes
hazardous materials of RCRA Subtitle C.
However, the SWMU's are subject to regu-
lation regardless of whether the materials are
hazardous.
The Resource Conservation and Recov-
ery Act (RCRA) § 1004 defines "solid waste"
as any "discarded material" resulting from
industrial activities. Owen Electric argued
that its slag is not a "discarded material"
because it is ultimately recycled. The EPA
countered by arguing that because the slag
lies dormant and exposed on the ground for
six months, it is discarded even if it is later
used in another capacity.
The court accorded EPA's statutory inter-
pretations substantial deference, and held
that the EPA did not abuse its discretion in
concluding that the slag had become "part of
the waste disposal problem." Owen Electric
relied on American Mining Congress v.
EPA, 824 F.2d at 177 (D.C. Cir. 1987)
which held that a material is a solid waste if
it is not "destined for beneficial reuse or
recycling in a continuous process by the
generating industry itself." However, the
court concluded that Owen Electric inter-
preted this case too broadly after reviewing
subsequent caselaw which held that Ameri-
can Mining Congress only applied to
byproducts that are immediately recycled for
use in the same industry. Since Owen
Electric's slag was not immediately recycled
to be used later by Owen Electric, the EPA
was justified in finding that the slag was solid
waste.
- by Kin Semsch
CLEAN WATER ACT
Adams v. EPA, 38 F.3d 43 (1st Cir. 1994)
The First Circuit Court of Appeals denied
Adams' petition which opposed the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's (EPA) issu-
ance of a National Pollution Discharge Elimi-
nation System (NPDES) permit. EPA issued
the permit which allowed a wastewater treat-
ment facility in Seabrook, New Hampshire
to discharge effluent into the ocean. Adams,
who owns a beach-front house on the Gulf
of Maine, asserted three main complaints:
1) the calculations used for dilution were
inaccurate; 2) the plant's outfall would de-
crease the beach's recreational value; and 3)
the zone around the outfall limited shellfishing.
The Clean Water Act (CWA) requires a
NPDES permit for the emission of pollutants
into the water. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq.
The Seabrook plant must meet the Ocean
Discharge Criteria, including whether the
emission will 'unreasonably degrade' the
marine environment. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1343.
The process for securing an NPDES permit
first requires an application. The EPA then
issues a draft of the permit and provides a
thirty-day comment period. A public hear-
ing may be requested. After the final permit
decision, the Regional Administrator de-
cides whether to grant or deny an evidentiary
hearing if requested on the issues raised
during the comment period. The denial
constitutes a finalized action in thirty-days,
unless the party appeals to the Environmen-
tal Appeal Boards. If the Board denies
review, the Regional Administrator's earlier
decision becomes final. A party may then
seek judicial review in the Circuit Court of
Appeals.
Adams took issue with the draft permit
through an 8 count written complaint sub-
mitted during the comment period. New
Hampshire verified that the permit met the
state water quality standards. EPA issued
the final permit, and Adams requested an
evidentiary hearing. The Regional Adminis-
trator denied Adams an evidentiary hearing
because he failed to provide a material issue
of fact. Adams requested the Environmental
Appeals Board (EAB) to review the decision
and the EAB denied his appeal. Therefore,
the Administrator's decision became final.
The First Circuit Court of Appeals re-
viewed Adam's petition to determine whether
the EPA complied with the Ocean Discharge
Criteria or acted in an "arbitrary or capri-
cious" manner. The arbitrary and capricious
standard, required by the Administrative
Procedure Act, accords great deference to
Agency action. Therefore, the court ana-
lyzed whether EPA barred Adams in an
arbitrary or capricious manner in light of the
procedural default doctrine.
The court found that the EAB lacked a
rational basis for contending that Adams
improperly raised his complaint during the
public comment period. The court found
that Adams met the "threshold requirement
of materiality" and noted the underlying
policy of encouraging public participation.
Consequently, the court deemed the EAB's
action of ignoring the record as arbitrary and
capricious.
The court applied the summary judgment
standard for Adams' request for an
Evidentiary Hearing. New Hampshire certi-
fied that Seabrook's plant would not violate
its water quality standards. EPA based the
final permit on New Hampshire's findings,
thus creating a rebuttable presumption.
Adams failed to provide an evidentiary basis
for why EPA or New Hampshire was incor-51
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rect and thus, failed to rebut the presump-
tion that the discharge would cause unrea-
sonable degradation. The court held that
EPA did not arbitrarily or capriciously deny
Adams' claims because they lacked a "genu-
ine issue of material fact" as to why EPA
could not rest on New Hampshire's certifica-
tion.
Adams also failed to assert of genuine
issue of material fact regarding the design
and location of the outfall. In addition,
Adams provided no data to substantiate
unreasonable degradation of marine life. As
such, EPA's reliance on New Hampshire's
certification that provided for coliform limits
to protect public health was not arbitrary or
capricious.
Finally, the court found Adams did not
establish that the shellfish closure zone would
result in a loss of recreational or economic
value unreasonable in comparison with the
benefits of the discharge. Again, Adams
failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact
to justify an evidentiary hearing.
- by Jill Moms
Concerned Area Residents For the Envi-
ronment v. Southview Farm, 34 F.3rd 114
(2nd Cir. 1994)
Plaintiffs, Concerned Area Residents For
the Environment (CARE), are a group of
citizens who live near Southview Farm.
Southview Farm, one of the largest farms in
the state, is a dairy farm located in the town
of Castile, New York. Defendants are the
farm itself and Richard H. Popp. CARE
brought this suit under the Clean Water Act
of 1977, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (1988
& Supp. IV 1992) (CWA). CARE also
alleged violations of state law for nuisance,
negligence and trespass. CARE's complaint
focuses on the spreading of liquid manure on
the dairy farm. The farm uses storage
lagoons that holds approximately six-to-
eight million gallons of liquid manure.
Through an irrigation system liquid manure
is propelled between 12 and 30 feet onto
fields. A large hose traveler is also used to
send liquid manure 150 feet in either direc-
tion. A piping system can carry the liquid
manure from the Southview Farm to various
locations without the use of vehicles.
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The plaintiffs alleged eleven CWA viola-
tions and a jury returned a verdict in favor of
the plaintiffs on five counts. On July 1,
1993, the defendants filed a motion for
judgment as a matter of law and the court
granted in part defendants' motion. Plain-
tiffs proceeded to file a timely notice of
appeal.
Without a permit and subject to certain
limitations, the CWA mandates that any
person discharging any pollutant is acting
unlawfully. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a). "Pollut-
ant" includes such substances as solid waste,
sewage, biological materials, and agricul-
tural waste discharged into water. 33 U.S.C.
§ 1362(6). Therefore, manure is considered
a pollutant. A "discharge" us defined as
"any addition of any pollutant to navigable
waters from any point source." 33 U.S.C. §
1362(12). The term point source is the
controversy in the court. "Point source"
includes "any discernible, confined and dis-
crete conveyance, including but not limited
to any ... concentrated animal feeding op-
eration [CAFO. This term does not include
agricultural stormwater discharges and re-
turn flows from irrigated agriculture." 33
U.S.C. § 1362(14).
The first complaint arose when the plain-
tiffs observed liquid manure flowing into and
through a swale on the Wyant Farm which
continued to flow through a drain tile leading
directly into a stream and then into the
Genesee River. Appellants argue that be-
causethe Southview operations involve more
the 700 cattle, it is a facility which is defined
in the regulations under the Act as a CAFO,
and therefore a "point source" under the
Act. Even though a permit for discharges
was not obtained as required, the district
court concluded Southview was not a CAFO
because crops are grown on a portion of the
farm.
The second complaint occurred on field
104 of the Wyant property which shares the
boundary line with Letchworth State Park.
A slew on field 104 collects liquid manure
spread by Southview's tankers and conveys
it through a pipe though Southview Farm to
the boundary of the state park. Two plain-
tiffs observed the manure flowing off the
Southview property and eventually into the
Genesee River. The district court and
appellees concluded that the discharge was
not a point source discharge because the
liquid naturally flowed into the stream. The
appellants contended that the manure was
channelled sufficiently to constitute a dis-
charge by a point source.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that in both instances the discharge
was from a point source. The court found
that the swale which leads into the stream
was in and of itself a point source. The court
notes that the court has previously defined
point source broadly. The court also points
out that a least one other court found a
defendant is not relieved from liability simply
because it does not actually maintain the
conveyances which transport the pollutants
into navigable water. The court also found
that the manure spreading devices them-
selves were point sources.
Two plaintiffs testified that they saw the
manure running through the field and dump-
ing in the comer of the field, above the
stream. They also testified that manure was
spread on the same field the very day they
saw the manure running. The district court
held that the jury's finding of discharge was
complete conjecture due to plaintiffs' failure
to offer direct eyewitness testimony on ma-
nure actually leaving the property. How-
ever, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
found that the jury had enough circumstan-
tial evidence to find discharges of liquid
manure to infer violations of the CWA.
The court also found that even though the
statute includes an exception for "agricul-
tural stormwater discharges", there is no
exemption for agricultural pollution simply
because it occurs on rainy days. The court
held that the jury had a reasonable basis to
find the discharges were not a result of rain,
but rather simply occurred on days when it
was rainy.
- by Jacqueline K. Hamra
Leather Industries of America, Inc., v.
EPA, 40 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 1994)
Petitioners Leather Industries of America,
Incorporated, the Association of Metropoli-
tan Sewerage Agencies, the Milwaukee
Metropolitan Sewerage District, and the City
of Pueblo Colorado (Leather Industries) chal-
lenged certain regulations enacted by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regu-E LPR
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lating the use and disposal of sewage sludge.
The Clean Water Act of 1972 (CWA) sets
forth provisions relating to the management
of sewage sludge which is the by-product of
pre-discharge sewage. In addition, these
provisions deal with the treatment of waste-
water by public and private treatment works
(POTWs) directing the EPA to enact dis-
charge standards. Following the enactment
of the CWA the amount of sewage sludge
from POTWs has nearly doubled. In 1977
the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
amended the CWA to provide standards for
safe use and disposal of sewage sludge
through guidance from the EPA. In 1987,
another amendment required the EPA to
enact regulations setting "numeric limits for
toxic pollutants that may be present in
sewage sludge in concentrations which may
adversely affect public health or the environ-
ment." In addition, it set forth practices for
the use and disposal of this type of contami-
nated sludge. These regulations were to be
enacted in two phases, the first of which
establishes the limits on ten pollutants in
sludge to be used for land application. The
EPA formulated four tables or levels of
concentrations.
Leather Industries challenged the applica-
tion of the 99th percentile caps in Table 3
because they are not related to risk of harm.
Should the sludge fall into the third Table and
the concentration of each of the pollutants in
the sludge is below the Table 3 caps, as well
as the Table 1 caps, it is considered "clean"
sludge and may be utilized on the land
without further regulation. The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals held that the
"regulatory safe harbor for land application
of sewage sludge based on the 99th percen-
tile levels of chromium and selenium indi-
cated in a national survey violated the Clean
Water Act."
One petitioner, City of Pueblo, challenged
the method for assessing risk used to derive
the risk-based limits on selenium in Tables 1
and 2. Specifically, City of Pueblo chal-
lenged the standard of a "child who ingests
sewage sludge daily for up to 5 years" with
respect to "public contact sites" to which
children had no access. The court held that
the EPA failed to supply a rational relation-
ship between its exposure assumptions and
the actual usage regulated by such assump-
tions in that there was no rational basis for
its highly conservative assumptions on ex-
posure to selenium from land application of
sewage sludge.
City of Pueblo also argued that because
the EPA did not provide for site-specific
variances, they were prohibited from ap-
pealing the land application limitations ac-
cording to the Administrative Procedure
Act. The court held that the EPA, in keeping
with its discretion, had no obligation to
develop site-specific variance procedures
for the regulation of selenium in sewage
sludge for individual land application sites.
In addition, Leather Industries challenged
the EPA's authority to regulate under Table
2 based on phytotoxicity where a greater
than 50% reduction in plant growth results.
The court held that the EPA abused its
discretion in establishing phytotoxicity limit
on soil concentration of chromium in sew-
age sludge applied to land.
-by Tracy L. Warren
CLEAN AIR ACT
Save Our Health Organization v. Recomp
of Minnesota, Inc. 37 F.3d 1334 (8th Cir.
1994)
Plaintiffs, the Save Our Health Organiza-
tion (Save Our Health), brought suit against
Recomp of Minnesota, Incorporated
(Recomp), alleging an exceedance of allow-
able odor levels. Recomp operated a land-
fill/compost station in St. Cloud, Minnesota,
and was required to follow Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) approved odor
standards that Minnesota's State Implemen-
tation Plan (SIP) established under the Clean
Air Act (CAA).
On appeal from the United States District
Court of Minnesota, which granted Recomp's
motion for summary judgment, the parties
each brought separate appeals before the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. Recomp
argued that the court did not have jurisdic-
tion, and the plaintiffs did not have standing
to bring suit. Save Our Health maintained
that the violations it cited in its notice of
intent to sue were sufficient to establish a
claim.
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals af-
firmed the district court below and held that
the CAA, under which Minnesota's SIP
operates, gives any person the right to sue a
party on the basis that a SIP has violated. In
this case, Save Our Health's allegations that
Recomp violated the SIP's emission stan-
dard established both authority to sue and
subject matter
jurisdiction.
The court also affirmed the lower court's
grant of Recomp's motion for summary
judgment. It found that while Save Our
Health's notice of intent to sue did document
odor violations attributed to Recomp, as
required by the CAA's provision for citizen
suits, the violations did not exceed the upper
levels set by Minnesota's SIP. The SIP
designated an "odor unit" test, which varies
the number of odor units allowable by the
municipal zoning of the particular location.
The test results Save Our Health included
in its notice of intent to sue showed viola-
tions all below the level of two odor units.
While the samples originated in different
areas, all were zoned either "light industrial,
" which allows a maximum of two odor units,
or "highway commercial," for which the SIP
did not specify an odor unit limit. However,
for the purposes of determining ambient air
contamination, the court stated that high-
way commercial zones should also be limited
to two odor units, based on the similarity
between light industrial and highway com-
mercial zones.
The court did not allow Save Our Health
to use additional test results procured by
county officials that would have more con-
clusively shown a violation. Despite the fact
that Recomp may have known of the tests,
the court determined Recomp was not given
sufficient notice of the additional samples, as
these results were not included in the plaintiff's
notice of intent to sue.
The court did state that it would be
permissible for Save Or Health to file a new
suit based on the additional odor test results.
However, that future court would have to
make a finding on the issue of whether or
not the CAA allows for the EPA to be the
body which approves SIPs that pertain to
odor regulation, an issue on which the
instant court did not make a determination.
-by Sarah Madden
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Alabama Power Co. v. EPA, 40 F.3d 450
(D.C. Cir. 1994)
In 1990, to protect natural resources and
public health from the hazards of acid rain,
Congress enacted programs to limit the
levels of nitrogen oxides (NOx) emitted by
specific sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7651. The
programs required the Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) to promulgate rules
that set limits on NO subx emissions from
certain types of coal-burning boilers used by
utility companies. In addition, the EPA was
required to authorize "alternative emission
limitation" (AEL) if a utility company could
prove that is was unable to meet the emis-
sions limit set forth in the EPA rule by using
"low NO subx burner technology". The
utility could only receive an AEL if their
current "low NO subx burner technology"
was unable to control emissions as stated in
the EPA rule.
The central issue in the case revolved
around what Congress meant by "low NO
subx bumer technology". The plaintiff ar-
gued Congress intended "low NO subx bumer
technology" to mean low NOx burners only.
The EPA asserted the language in question
was intended by Congress to include low
NOx burners and overfire air, another emis-
sion control technique sometimes used with
NOx burners. Thus the EPA, when it
promulgated its rule as directed by 42 U.S.C.
§ 7651, insisted the questionable language
to mean that a utility, in order to receive an
AEL, had to prove their burners plus overfire
air technology was unable to meet the emis-
sion limit set forth in the EPA rule. The
plaintiff, on the other hand, argued a utility
only had to prove their burners were unable
to meet the emission limit in order to receive
an AEL.
The case came down to a statutory inter-
pretation question with each side arguing
the intentions of Congress. The EPA be-
lieved it was Congress' intention for "low
NO subx burner technology" to mean bum-
ers and overfire air because more utilities
would be required to meet the prescribed
emission limit. The petitioners argued that
the EPA did not have authority from the
statute to include overfire air in the definition
54
of "low NO subx burners".
The disputed language of "low NO subx
bumer technology" was found by the District
of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals to
mean only low NOx burners and not overfire
air. The court found the EPA did exceed its
authority because the language was unam-
biguous and the intention of Congress was
clear to mean only burners. When a statute
uses technical language or terms, the courts
assume Congress intended the terms to
have its established meaning, in the absence
of contrary intention by Congress. Specifi-
cally, the court found express statutory lan-
guage that utilities seeking an AEL need not
install equipment beyond low NO subx bum-
ers. In addition, no technical literature relied
on by the EPA indicates that low NOx bumer
technology refers to a combination of low
NOx burners and overfire air. The court
found the statutory text, structure, and his-
tory of 42 U.S.C. § 7651(b)(1), supported
the conclusion that Congress could have
only meant burners and not overfire air.
The court concluded the EPA's rule ex-
ceeded their statutory authority. Accord-
ingly, the utility companies were able to
suspend any compliance with emission lim-
its until further rulemaking by the EPA.
- by Christy L. Fisher
NEPA
Galloway v. Arkansas State Highway and
Transportation Dep't, 885
S.W.2d 17 (Ark. 1994)
This case stems from a suit filed by
William W. Galloway and others (Galloway)
against the Arkansas State Highway and
Transportation Department (ASHTD) to
enjoin a construction project that would
widen a portion of Highway 64. Galloway
claimed that: 1) ASHTD was required to
hold public hearings and prepare an Envi-
ronmental Impact Statement (EIS) for the
project; and 2) ASHTD's expenditures on
the project, were not in accordance with
federal law, and were therefore illegal exac-
tions under the Arkansas Constitution.
Shortly after the suit was filed, ASHTD
awarded the contract for the project to
Southern Pavers, Inc.. Galloway, wanting to
prevent Southern Pavers from doing any
work on the project, filed and received a
preliminary injunction. The injunction, how-
ever, was conditioned on the fact that Gallo-
way post a $500,000 bond. This bond was
never paid. The trial court dismissed
Galloway's suit after concluding that ASHTD:
1) complied with appropriate federal law;
and 2) was not required to hold a public
hearing on the matter. Galloway appealed
the decision, arguing that the trail court erred
in two respects.
Galloway argued first that the require-
ment of a $500,000 bond denied him due
process. He claimed that Southern Paver's
potential damages as an intervenor were not
caused by his suit, but rather by the fact that
ASHTD awarded Southern Paver the con-
tract for the project after the original suit was
filed. The Supreme Court cited to ARCP
65(d), which gives the trial court discretion in
requiring security as a condition precedent
to a preliminary injunction. In addition, the
Supreme Court noted that Galloway had
cited no authority for his position and had
not attempted to show how he was pre-
vented from obtaining a preliminary injunc-
tion.
Second, Galloway argued that the trial
court erred in granting a directed verdict by
finding that no public hearing or EIS was
required for the highway project. The Su-
preme Court found the highway project to
be a federal action for purposes of the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).
This mater was of little dispute since the
project was going to receive eighty percent
of its funding from the Federal Highway
Administration (FHWA). The court exam-
ined the regulations promulgated by the
FHWA implementing NEPA in order to
determine whether ASHTD had complied.
The regulations specifically set out the cir-
cumstances where a public hearing was
required for any Federal-aid project that
includes: 1) significant amounts of right-of-
way; 2) substantial changes in the layout or
functions of connecting roadways or of the
facility being improved; 3) substantial ad-
verse impact on abutting property; or 4)
otherwise has a significant social, economic,
environmental or other effect, or for which
the FHWA determines that a public hearing
is in the public interest. 23 C.F.R.
§§771.111(h)(2)(iii). After the FHWA and
the ASHTD inspected the site where the
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proposed project was to take place, the
ASHTD determined that no public hearing
was required. The FHWA subsequently
approved the project. The Supreme Court
viewed the FHWA's acquiescence as a clear
indication that the highway project did not
fall into any of the above categories and
therefore, must have been categorically ex-
cluded from NEPA requirements. In order to
overturn an agency's categorical exclusion
determination, the action must be arbitrary
and capricious. Since Galloway cited no
authority that would support such a finding
the Supreme Court of Arkansas upheld the
trial court's decision that a public hearing
and an environmental impact statement were
not required in the instant case.
- by Greg Moldafsky
Sierra Club v. Espy, 38 F.3d 792 (5th Cir.
1994)
This is an interlocutory appeal challeng-
ing the district court's ruling that the Sierra
Club was entitled to a preliminary injunction
against the Forest Service's even-aged man-
agement practices in four Texas National
Forests. The case was based on nine
pending timber sales within the four Na-
tional Forests. The district court held that
the environmental assessments (EA's) con-
ducted by the Forest Service for each of the
nine sales did not comply with either the
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA)
or the National Forest Management Act
(NFMA). First, the district court believed that
the NFMA only provided for the use of even-
aged management techniques in "excep-
tional circumstances." Second, the court
held that the Forest Service did not ad-
equately consider the environmental conse-
quences and criticisms of its proposed ac-
tions. The district court focussed specifically
on the fact that even-aged management was
the predominant timber method chosen for
all nine sites.
Even-aged management includes
clearcutting, shelterwood cutting, and seed
tree cutting methodologies. To conform
with the NFMA, the Forest Service may
choose clearcutting as its management policy
only if it is the optimal method" for achiev-
ing the objectives and requirements of the
Forest's Land and Resource Management
Plan (LRMP). Similarly, in order to use
shelterwood cutting or seed cutting, the
Forest Service must determine that those
methods are "appropriate" for achieving the
objectives and goals of the LRMP.
In an effort to determine the scope of the
Forest Service's authority under the NFMA,
the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals looked at
the legislative history of the act. The court
recognized that there was a delicate balance
struck in Congress between those favoring
and those disfavoring even-aged manage-
ment techniques. As such, the NFMA must
reflect that balance. The fact that even-aged
management can only be used if it is the
optimum or appropriate method to accom-
plish the objectives of the LRMP does not
make it the exception to the rule. The court
stated that the requirement of even-aged
management to protect forest resources
does not itself limit its use. The court
concluded that the district court's interpreta-
tion that even-aged management only be
used in exceptional circumstances was too
harsh. The NFMA only requires the Forest
Service to meet certain substantive require-
ments before even-aged management could
be used.
The next issue was whether the Forest
Service had met those substantive require-
ments. The district court held that the Forest
Service's even-aged management plan failed
to protect forest diversity and resources.
The court defined "protection" narrowly so
that the Forest Service's failure to consider
old growth forests and its acknowledgement
that some forest species would be dimin-
ished were inadequate protection. The Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals held that the NFMA's
multiple use mandate contemplated both
even and uneven aged management. The
court pointed out that the NFMA regulations
provide that reductions in plant, animal, and
tree diversity may be prescribed only where
needed to meet overall multiple-use objec-
tives. The statutory language of the NFMA
leaves such policy-oriented decisions up to
the managing agency's discretion. The
NFMA only mandates that the Forest Ser-
vice manage fish and wildlife habitats to
insure viable populations of species and to
ensure diversity in plant and animal commu-
nities. The Forest Service looked at a variety
of alternatives including no action, even-
aged management, and uneven-ages man-
agement. In addition, the Forest Service
noted in its EA that all wildlife populations
will remain at viable levels. The findings of
the court show that by choosing an even-
aged management policy, the seven species
of wildlife will increase with only two species
decreasing. However, by choosing an un-
even-aged management policy only two
species of wildlife will increase while the rest
decrease. Having extensively looked at the
alternatives and the effects of their actions,
the court concluded that the Forest Service
had not exceeded its authority under the
NFMA.
The next major issue in the case involved
the Forest Service's compliance with NEPA.
The district court held that the Forest Service
did not take a "hard look" at the alternatives
and consequences of their actions. The
Court of Appeals disagreed and pointed out
that the Forest Service had considered four
alternatives for the first eight timber sites and
five alternatives for the ninth site. In addi-
tion, the EA addressed the consequences of
each of its alternatives on wildlife, vegeta-
tion, water, soil, and recreation resources, as
well as any applicable mitigating circum-
stances. The court concluded that the




Green Hills Solid Waste Management
Authority v. Madison Township Planning
and Zoning Commission, 892 S.W.2d 621
(Mo.Ct.App. 1994)
Green Hills Solid Waste Management
Authority (Green Hills), representing thir-
teen Missouri municipalities, formed to es-
tablish a nonhazardous solid waste landfill.
In 1989, Green Hills purchased a tract of
land in Mercer County, Missouri, which was
located in Madison Township. Both the
Madison Township Planning and Zoning
Commission (Commission) and the Missouri
Department of Natural Resources (DNR)
denied the various applications Green Hills
filed.
Green Hills sued for declaratory relief to
establish that it met statutory requirements
- 55
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for overruling the planning and zoning com-
mission decision and to determine if the
Commission's regulations were unreason-
able. The circuit court dismissed the plaintiff's
claim, holding that Green Hills failed to
exhaust administrative remedies before fil-
ing suit.
In reversing the decision of the court
below, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the
Western District stated that in respect to
Green Hills' claims against the Commission,
only an appeal from the Commission's deci-
sion would require Green Hills to exhaust
administrative remedies. The court deter-
mined that Green Hills' suit was instead an
action for declaratory judgment, which al-
leged the Commission's zoning restrictions
were invalid. Therefore, statutory proce-
dure requirements did not demand Green
Hills first appeal the Commission's decision
to the township Board of Zoning Adjust-
ment, as the Commission argued.
However, the Commission also alleged
that Green Hills failed to exhaust other
existing administrative remedies in that Green
Hills did not appeal the DNR's negative
decision. The DNR denied Green Hills'
application on the basis that it did not show
Green Hills proceeded in accordance with
local zoning requirements. To appeal a
DNR decision, parties must request a hear-
ing within thirty days, which Green Hills
claimed it did, resulting in a DNR request to
get a declaratory judgment against the Com-
mission. The court, however, could find no
evidence of the appeal or subsequent DNR
order in the record. Therefore, the Court
remanded the case to determine if Green
Hills did in fact exhaust its administrative
remedies with respect to the DNR
- by Sarah Madden
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Dico, Inc. v. Diamond, 35 F.3d 348 (8th
Cir. 1994)
Dico, Incorporated (Dico) brought suit
against the Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA) and others for reimbursement of costs
incurred as a result of compliance of an
administrative order to clean up a contami-
nated ground water cite in Des Moines,
Iowa. The United States District Court for
the Southern District of Iowa granted sum-
mary judgment to the EPA and this appeal
followed.
The Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act of 1986 (SARA) grants "any
person who receives and complies with the
terms of any order issued [by the EPA] the
right to petition the EPA for reimbursement
of any response costs the party incurred for
which it was not liable." 42 U.S.C. §
9606(b)(2). When the EPA denies any such
request, that party can bring a reimburse-
ment action against the EPA in federal court.
This procedure facilitates expeditious cleanup
by potentially responsible parties who may
or may not be responsible for a particular
Superfund site.
Dico was ordered by the EPA to design
and implement a system to capture and treat
the contaminated groundwater found on
their property. The EPA order mandated
extensive and expensive procedures to which
Dico responded to by letter and in a hearing.
The EPA modified the order several times,
and Dico brought the remedial system into
operation.
When Dico petitioned the EPA for reim-
bursement, their request was denied due to
the fact that the EPA's original order was
issued prior to the effective date of SARA.
The district court upheld the EPA's decision
regarding the reimbursement provision and
dismissed Dico's due process and takings
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
On appeal, the Eighth Circuit Court of
Appeals held that the EPA's interpretation
of the reimbursement provision is not en-
titled to judicial deference under Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984). An
agency's interpretation of a statutory provi-
sion is required only if the agency is charged
with administering the statute. Id. at 844.
SARA allows the United States District Courts
to decide disputes, therefore the reimburse-
ment provision is subject to judicial scrutiny.
Next, the court concluded that since the
EPA modified the initial order three times,
the final time being after SARA became
effective, the reimbursement provision would
be available to Dico. Finding for Dico, the
court rejected the EPA's argument that for a
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party to proceed under the reimbursement
provision, it must have received and com-
plied with an order subsequent to SARA's
effective date. The EPA cited cases in
support, but the court distinguished them in
that those courts granted deference to the
EPA's determination on the availability of
the reimbursement provision, and also that
these claimants had a "cleanup order in final
form well before" the effective date.
In this case, Dico's requested modifica-
tions made the resulting order quite different
from the original order. Furthermore, the
court held that Dico was not capable of
complying with the order until it received the
last modification, which was subsequent to
when the reimbursement provision became
effective. Therefore, the reimbursement
provision of SARA is available to Dico.
However, the court left open whether the
reimbursement provision applied retroac-
tively to a party who received and complied
with an order issued prior to SARA's eff2c-
tive date.
- by C. Todd Ahrens
United States v. Liebman, 40 F.3d 544
(2nd Cir. 1994)
Defendant David Liebman and his family
owned a company that owned a mill in
Rockville, Connecticut. In an attempt to sell
the mill, Defendant hired a broker who
learned, through an environmental assess-
ment, that asbestos was used to insulate
pipes on the premises. As a result, the
broker arranged for the removal of two large
boilers which were insulated by asbestos.
He hired two local salvagers, two teenage
boys and another man to do the removal.
Defendant claimed he was unaware there
would be asbestos removal.
Defendant took over management of the
removal process when he had problems with
his broker. He realized it involved asbestos,
but continued to illegally remove and dis-
pose of the asbestos in plastic bags to a
gravel pit in the woods. Ultimately, the
govemment discovered the illegally disposed
asbestos and prosecuted defendant. Defen-
dant plead guilty to failing to report environ-
mental release to the appropriate federal
agency in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 9603(b).
Pursuant to USSG § 3B13.1 (Sentencing
Guidelines), the district court increasedME LP RI
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defendant's base offense level from eight to
twelve and accordingly sentenced him to 10
months imprisonment and a $3,000 fine.
Defendant appealed from this base level
increase and sentence.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals
reviewed the trial court's determinations
under the Sentencing Guidelines. Remand-
ing for resentencing, the court found that the
base offense level increase pursuant to §
3B1.1(B) was erroneous. The statute stipu-
lates that such an increase in the base
offense level requires a finding that defen-
dant supervised five or more participants in
criminal activity or that the activity was
"otherwise extensive." The trial court did
not make any specific findings in support of
a §3B1.1(b) determination. The court thus
remanded to the trial court for specific
findings that satisfy §3B1.1(b).
In advising the trial court to make specific
findings pursuant to § 3B1.1(b), the court
found defendant to be a "supervisor" as
defined in the statute in that he, "exercise[d]
some degree of control over others involved
in the commission of the offense." How-
ever, the court found defendant did not have
control over the requisite "five" criminally
responsible people because the teenagers
involved were not criminally responsible.
Also, in analyzing § 3B1.1(b), the court
rejected defendant's argument that the "oth-
erwise extensive" language does not apply
to him because he was not an "organiza-
tion". The court construed the intent of the
drafters to use "organization" for conve-
nience in indicating any group of people
working together and thus included defen-
dant and his actions.
In addition to the defendant's § 3B1.1(b)
argument, the court found the trial court
could hear defendant's contention that his
guilty plea was for a record keeping offense
as opposed to a substantive offense. This,
according to defendant, means that any
base level increase was inappropriate. Al-
though this issue was not brought up in trial,
the court allowed it to be considered on
remand since remand was already required.
Additionally, the court found the alleged
errors in determinations made on other base
offense level increases were correct. The
court found that, under § 2Q1.2(b)(1)(A), an
enhancement for ongoing and repetitive
discharge of hazardous substances does not
require proof of actual contamination. In-
stead the court found contamination will be
assumed. The court also found, pursuant to
§ 2Q1.2(b)(5), that an application of the
sentencing guidelines to defendant's plea
depends on whether or not his offense was
an effort to hide substantive environmental
offenses and not only on actual substantive
offenses.
Ultimately, the defendant's conviction was
affirmed but the sentence was vacated and
remanded for resentencing based on the
rulings of the Second Circuit Court of Ap-
peals.
- by Joseph P. Hewes
Roberson v. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
863 F. Supp. 929 (W.D. Ark. 1994)
Defendant DuPont manufactured and dis-
tributed a fungicide named Benlate. The
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA)
placed a stop order on the sale, use and
removal of Benlate due to its contamination
with atrazine, an herbicide. Plaintiffs Joseph
and James Roberson claim the contamina-
tion harmed their peach orchards.
The contamination allegedly occurred
when a contract manufacturer of DuPont,
Terra International, Incorporated (Terra),
produced the Benlate. Prior to making
Benlate, Terra produced Prozine, which
consists of atrazine. After cleaning its equip-
ment with starch and sugar, Terra used the
contaminated starch and sugar in producing
Benlate, a process of which DuPont was
aware. Plaintiffs claim Terra used applica-
tion rates of the contaminated starch and
sugar at three times the intended intensity
and also used defective packaging which
exposed the Benlate to warm, humid air,
resulting in the formation of phytotoxic
compounds harmful to crops. Plaintiffs
claimed DuPont knew all of the above before
registering the Benlate with the EPA and
never told the EPA thereafter of the defects.
DuPont claimed the Federal Insecticide,
Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) pre-
empts the plaintiffs' state law claims of
negligence, strict liability, and breach of
warranty. Under FIFRA, a manufacturer
may not market a pesticide until it registers
with the EPA. Applicants for registration
must include proposed product labels. The
final labels must be adequate or accurate or
the company will face civil and criminal
penalties, including revocation of its registra-
tion. As for packaging requirements, FIFRA
only requires packaging sufficient to protect
children and adults from serious injury or
illness.
FIFRA's express preemption clause re-
quires states to refrain from imposing any
labeling or packaging requirements "in addi-
tion to or different from" the FIFRA require-
ments. The court adhered to precedent and
statutory language, and held the plaintiffs'
failure to wam claim was preempted by
FIFRA. In addition, FIFRA does not distin-
guish between inadequate labeling and inad-
equate packaging; FIFRA thus preempts
state law claims of negligence and strict
liability as they relate to a failure to warn or
inadequate packaging.
The plaintiffs next claimed DuPont did
not give the EPA all of the information it
possessed concerning the production of the
Benlate and was thus estopped from relying
on FIFRA's preemption language. FIFRA
operates under the premise that the EPA
must rely on the producers of pesticides to
provide accurate information, and there is a
risk that some ingredients may be withheld
because they are trade secrets. The court
held DuPont may be estopped from relying
on FIFRA's preemption language if it with-
held material facts from the agency. While
this may undermine the federal government's
control of pesticide production, the court
explained that companies would rather be
more careful in their labeling and packaging
than risk facing liability under state law
claims.
As for the plaintiffs' breach of express
warranty claims, the court relied onCipollone
v. Liggett Group, 112 S. Ct. 2608 (1992),
and held FIFRA did not preempt their claim.
Although FIFRA prohibits the states from
imposing further labeling requirements, the
express warranties at issue are imposed by
the EPA, not the state. The EPA sets out the
standards companies must follow when
making the labels but does not dictate ex-
actly what must be said. As for the implied
warranty claims, state law determines those
obligations and FIFRA is thus preempted to
the extent the labeling and packaging are
guaranteed.
Finally, the court refused to hear the
plaintiffs' claims that DuPont violated stan-
dards of care established by FIFRA. While
the plaintiffs may have been correct in
stating FIFRA contains the correct standards
for determining whether DuPont violated
state law, the court held the issues were not
properly before it since DuPont did not
move to dismiss those claims.
- by Stephen B. Maule
-L 57
